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Abstract  
We investigate the aggregate-level effects of parental leave legislation on various 
labour market outcomes of women in 16 European countries for the period since 
1970. The paper updates and extends previous findings in the literature. Results 
show increases in participation rates that diminish with length and generosity of 
leave schemes. While pure participation numbers may not increase as dramatically 
as hoped, there is strong evidence of increases in weekly working hours. On the 
flipside, decreases in wages for high-skilled workers and amplified occupational 
segregation are likely results of generous leave schemes. We conclude with a 
discussion of recent debates over extending minimum maternity and parental leave 
rights on the European level. 
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1. Introduction 
Within  Europe,  leave  schemes  for  parents  have  been  going  through  a  steady  evolution. 
Maternity  leave  has  existed  for  most  of  the  20
th  century,  reinforced  by  the  1952  ILO 
convention on maternity protection. In 1992, the EU adopted directive 92/85/EEC on paid 
maternity leave, making 14 weeks of paid maternity leave the minimum in the EU member 
states,  though  many  countries  already  had  more  generous  schemes.  In  1996,  directive 
96/34/EC of the European Council obliged member states to introduce unpaid parental leave 
that enables parents to care full-time for their child over a period of three months. More 
recently parental leave legislation was again on the EU scene, as a 2010 directive repealing 
directive 96/34/EC increased the length of (unpaid) parental leave to four months, extended 
its application to atypical employment contracts and made at least one month of parental leave 
exclusive  to  each  parent.  Further  legislations  at  the  EU  level  are  being  debated  in  the 
European Parliament with regards to increasing paid maternity leave from 14 weeks to 20 
weeks and introducing paid paternity leave for a minimum of two weeks.  
The changes in maternity and parental leave legislation appear to be in line with the 
emphasis on increasing the female participation rate as articulated in the Lisbon agenda. At 
the same time, there seems to be little knowledge on the aggregate labour market effects of 
parental leave legislation. An earlier study by Ruhm (1998), covering eight EU countries and 
Norway and using data from the period between 1969 and 1993, found positive effects of paid 
leave  on  female  labour  force  participation  at  the  cost  of  declining  wages.  Since  Ruhm’s 
widely cited study, there has been little aggregate level research on the impact of parental 
leave legislation on labour market outcomes. An update seems reasonable given that the data 
used are aging, only a small number of countries are covered and the longer unpaid parental 
leave  is  not  taken  into  account.  As  an  update  and  extension  to  these  issues,  this  study 
therefore examines the effects of leave legislation on employment rates, average weekly hours 
worked, wages, and vertical occupational segregation for the period between 1970 and 2010.  
Legislative information is acquired from Gauthier and Brotnik’s (2001) “Comparative 
Maternity, Parental Leave and Child Care Database” and is supplemented by findings from   3 
other sources on maternity and parental leave legislation. The aggregate level indicators for 
the  aforementioned  labour  market  outcomes  are  collected  from  the  databases  of  OECD, 
Eurostat and ILO. The results of our analysis indicate increases in participation rates that 
diminish with length and generosity of leave schemes. While pure participation numbers may 
not increase dramatically, there is strong evidence of increases in weekly working hours. 
Concurrently, according to the effects on proxy indicators, a decrease is observed in high skill 
wages alongside an increase in vertical occupational segregation. 
  The structure of the article is as follows. The second section discusses justifications 
for maternity and parental leave, a theoretical background on the effects of leave legislation 
on  labour  market  outcomes  and  the  findings  of  some  recent  empirical  studies.  The  third 
section introduces the available data and connects them with the fourth section that presents 
the difference-in-difference methodology used. The fifth section contains the results of our 
empirical analysis. Finally, the sixth section concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations and Literature Review 
In leave research, nearly every type of leave has multiple names, making it necessary to 
clarify  the  terms  used  throughout  this  study.  Two  different  types  of  leave  are  usually 
categorized: on the one hand maternity and paternity leave and on the other parental leave 
(Henau et al., 2007). Maternity and paternity leaves are typically concentrated around the 
birth of a child and cover a relatively short period of time with high replacement rates; most 
maternity leave entitlements cover a period between 14 and 20 weeks. Paternity leave is even 
shorter, often measured by days. In contrast, parental leave tends to be longer, ranging from 
an  extra  12  weeks  to  three  years,  and  has  lower  replacement  rates.  When  not  making  a 
distinction, together these two types will be simply called leave. 
  Leave  legislation  has  effects  on  three  distinct  areas  of  welfare,  and  most  of  the 
research and debate on its effects are concentrated around these. Historically, maternity leave 
legislation was passed for paternalistic reasons, namely to protect the health and well-being of 
mothers and new-born babies. As the earliest international legislation on the issue, the 1919   4 
ILO convention on maternity leave states that women are not permitted to work for six weeks 
after childbirth. The proposed health effects for infants continue to constitute the first section 
of the research on the impact of leave legislation. As the findings on child health appear to be 
positive (Ruhm, 2000), this positive externality is often used as a justification for mandating 
leave. Fertility is the second outcome that leave policy has an impact on. Given the drop in 
fertility rates, this specific effect has become more important. The general findings tend to be 
positive, though the combination of short parental leave durations and high fertility rates in 
some countries give some ambiguity to the results (Gauthier, 2007; Lalive and Zweimuller, 
2009). Fertility concerns continue to be a prime driver for leave legislation. The most recent 
example was in Germany where low fertility of working women led to a switch to an earnings 
related benefit system for the first year of parental leave. The final area that leave legislation 
has an impact on is the labour market and, specifically, the labour market outcomes of leave-
takers (which in most instances are women). At least some maternity leave is the norm around 
childbirth and the discussion in Europe focuses more on the optimal length of leave rather 
than questioning whether or not to have leave legislation at all. This paper studies in specific 
the effects of leave legislation on female labour market participation (both in rates and in 
hours worked), the relative wage level and the share of women in high level occupations. 
  Ruhm’s (1998) study explains the labour market effects of mandated leave within a 
supply and demand framework. The effects are realized both before and after motherhood. 
Before  pregnancy,  the  opportunity  for  future  leave  increases  the  supply  of  prospective 
parents.
1 After leave has been taken up, it provides a continuing labour market attachment. 
Combined, these effects lead to a shift of the supply curve to the right. At the same time, the 
training and replacement costs for firms cause a contraction in demand. If parental leave 
increases  employment  rates,  the  contraction  in  demand  should  have  a  smaller  effect  on 
employment. Figure 1 shows the situation: 
 
- Figure 1 Here - 
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In figure 1, the introduction of leave legislation leads to an increase in employment 
from E1 to E2.
1 Meanwhile wages decrease due to lower demand and higher supply; the 
actual impact in terms of employment and wages being dependant on the slope of the demand 
and supply curve. A more positive outlook on parental leave could argue that the demand 
curve also shifts to the right as firm-specific human capital is protected and workers become 
more  productive.  A  sufficient  shift  may  even  lead  to  an  increase  in  wages  alongside 
employment. 
Ruhm’s framework, at least in the post-birth analysis of leave effects, is implicit in 
other  research  (see  below)  predicting  positive  supply  side  effects  from  leave  legislation. 
Starting point is that in the absence of job guarantees parents will drop out of the labour 
market for a longer period of time. In this case, parental leave facilitates swifter and higher 
rates of return to work because the job security provided eliminates future search costs and 
the loss of firm-specific human capital. Additionally, the job security provided by parental 
leave may have a positive effect on participation and wage gaps between men and women. 
Protecting firm-specific human capital during early years of motherhood could lead to better 
opportunities for women to continue their careers. This would be consistent with the demand 
curve in figure 1 shifting to the right as a result of increased human capital and productivity.  
Contrary  to  the  above  framework,  there  are  findings  pointing  towards  a  negative 
participation and productivity effect of parental leave take-up (Ondrich et al. 1996; 2002). 
Mandated leave can lengthen time out of work and create artificial interruptions. This would 
have an adverse effect on supply, because parents take leave instead of continuing to work, 
and  on  demand,  because  time  out  of  work  deteriorates  leave-takers’  human  capital  and 
productivity. Hence, both wages and employment are likely to drop. It is worth stressing that 
while the drop in wages is uniformly predicted by both viewpoints, one of increased supply 
and the other of decreased demand and supply, the starting points are different. In the latter, 
wages drop due to longer periods out of work and decreased productivity of leave-takers.  
  Empirically,  there  exist  a  number  of  studies  utilizing  individual  level  data  to 
determine  the  effects  of  leave  legislation  on  wages,  employment  and  occupational   6 
segregation. Using data from Germany, Ondrich et al. (2002) find a substantial decrease of 
18% in wages for every year spent on parental leave. Buligescu et al. (2008) conclude that the 
negative effects of parental leave take-up on wages are fairly minimal or non-existent in the 
long  run  while  being  substantial  in  the  short  run.  The  rebound  in  wages  after  an  initial 
decrease upon return from parental leave seems faster than other types of career interruptions. 
Using data from Nordic countries, Datta Gupta et al. (2008) find negative effects from the 
presence  of  long-term  parental  leave  legislation  on  wages  and  consequently  for  career 
opportunities of women. Supporting the job security approach, Waldfogel (1998) observes 
that leave coverage diminishes the wage penalty on return for returning women. Long-term 
absence from work of any kind has negative effects on wages, but it is not clear whether 
parental leave decreases or amplifies these effects during early motherhood. 
  The findings with regards to the impact on employment are rather positive. Among 
aggregate  level  studies,  Jaumotte  (2003)  has  similar  findings  to  those  of  Ruhm  (1998). 
Female employment rates seem to increase in response to leave legislation, but the positive 
effects diminish as leave duration is increased. Pronzato (2009) also finds positive effects 
from leave as the provided job security increases the proportions of mothers returning to 
work. Making leave paid, however, decreases participation in the first year after birth. The 
positive labour supply effects of job security found by Pronzato (2009) also diminish with the 
duration of leave. Leave periods lasting more than a year may have an adverse effect on the 
return rates, both in terms of lengthening time out of work and decreasing the hazard rates of 
return  in  the  long  run  (Ondrich  et  al.,  1996).  Despite  the  generally  positive  results  on 
participation, there are findings that increased participation rates through generous welfare 
schemes  come  at  the cost  of increased  occupational  segregation (Mandel  and  Semyonov, 
2005). Occupational segregation as used by Mandel and Semyonov, and examined in this 
paper, is vertical rather than horizontal. Vertical occupational segregation in a gender context 
limits  career  opportunities  of  women.  Mandel  and  Semyonov  (2005)  argue  that  policy 
induced higher labour force participation among women may lead to a “less selective” female   7 
labour force; increasing statistical discrimination faced by women, which in turn damages 
career opportunities and wages.  
 
3. Data 
Data used in this study is a combination of several sources for EU-15 countries and Norway. 
Legislative information on leave is a combination of the Comparative Maternity, Parental and 
Childcare  Database  (Gauthier  and  Bortnik,  2001),  ILO  (2010)  legislation  archives  and  a 
number of articles and previous studies (Plantenga and Remery, 2005; OECD, 2009; Nyberg, 
2004). Data conflicts in several cases, usually as a result of differing definitions of maternity 
and parental leave. In such cases, the definitions laid out in the previous section were used to 
infer  what  constitutes  different  types  of  leave  in  a  given  country.  Additional  checks  on 
maternity  leave  were  done  using  the  Social  Security  Programmes  Throughout  the  World 
series. The values for some years were missing between 1999 and 2010, but the years with 
changes in leave could be found from Eurofound’s European Industrial Relations Observatory 
(2010). In cases where no reforms were registered into Eurofound’s observatory, it is assumed 
that no changes took place. 
  The  basic  characteristics  of  any  leave  legislation  can  be  summarized  through  its 
length,  the  level  of  benefits  during  leave,  flexibility  options  such  as  part-time  leave  and 
eligibility criteria. While it would be ideal to combine and measure the effects of all these 
characteristics, the focus inevitably shifts to benefits and length. Maternity leave varies little 
across Europe, with high replacement rates and durations of 14 to 20 weeks. The benefit 
difference between parental leave and maternity leave can and does vary considerably. One 
example is provided by the Danish reforms in 2002 which give mothers the right to 18 weeks 
of maternity leave with a wage replacement rate of 100% and 32 weeks of parental leave with 
benefits equaling  80%  of last  earned  wages.  On the  other end of  the  spectrum,  Austrian 
legislation includes 16 weeks of maternity leave with 100% replacement of last earned wages 
and 104 weeks of parental leave with low flat rate benefit for the first 78 weeks and no 
benefits  for  the  last  26  weeks.  Benefit  levels  are  important,  more  so  for  parental  leave,   8 
because they are the main determinant of the take-up rates, which in turn determines the 
actual impact of leave. The most straightforward method in taking into account these factors 
would be weighting duration with benefits. Unfortunately, data is difficult to find for benefits 
in  earlier  years  and  longer  unpaid  leave  would  be  completely  ignored.  Instead,  benefit 
thresholds  are  used  for  weighting  parental  leave.  As  summarized  in  table  I,  following 
Plantenga and Remery (2005) leave is weighted by 33% if the replacement level is between 
0% and 33%, by 66% if the replacement rate is between 33% and 67% and 100% if the 
replacement rate is above 67%. Appendix I shows the results of weighing for 2008. The 
purpose is to capture the increase in take-up rates as a result of increase in benefits. For 
maternity leave, data on benefit levels in nearly all years is available and is used directly for 
weighting. As a result the weighted (maternity and parental) leave is calculated as: (Maternity 
Leave Duration*Maternity Leave Benefits% )+(Parental Leave Duration*Weight%) 
 
- Table I Here - 
 
Several countries’ benefits were or currently are flat rate. The lack of data with regards to the 
benefit  amounts  requires  some  interpolation  for  weighing  that  may  cause  under  or 
overestimations. While there are a large number of missing values, Gauthier and Brotnik’s 
dataset  puts  the  flat  rate  benefits  of  Belgium  and  Germany  below  33%  of  the  average 
previously earned wages for most years. For two countries, Austria and Luxembourg, the 
benefit amount of 2006 and 2007 is calculated as a percentage of the real median wage of the 
total working population as reported by OECD statistics. In earlier years until 1999, Gauthier 
and Brotnik’s dataset shows no benefits for Austrian parental leave. The 2007 benefit amount 
is above €600 in Austria and €1840 in Luxembourg. While both values are close to 33% and 
66% thresholds respectively, Austrian parental leave is weighed by 33% and Luxembourg’s 
by 100%. This weighted leave variable combining both maternal and parental leave is used as 
the main independent variable in the analysis section.   9 
  There are a few country specific peculiarities in parental leave legislation that should 
be mentioned. In Sweden and Finland, maternity leave and parental leave legislations are 
combined in the dataset since their legislation makes little distinction between them. French 
legislation  provides  parental  leave  benefits  for  second  or  later  child.  These  benefits  are 
ignored and French parental leave is considered unpaid in the present dataset. Some countries, 
including  Spain  and  Italy,  provide  family  based  parental  leave  rather  than  individual 
entitlements to leave. In such cases all leave is assumed to be taken by the mother. The 
available figures for take-up rates of men are small for most countries, 5% in Italy and Spain 
and  merely  1%  in  France  (Fagan  and  Walthery,  2007).
  Unlike  the  case  in  many  other 
international comparisons, individual entitlements to leave are not multiplied by two to arrive 
at total leave due to the marked difference in take-up rates. Since the interest is on the effects 
on  female  labour,  the  amount  available  to  the  mother  is  the  only  leave  right  taken  into 
account.  
It is worth stressing the focus on national legislation leaves out employer inputs in 
designing leave facilities. Collective agreements play a large role in determining the benefits 
levels in several countries (Plantenga and Remery, 2005). As an extreme example, Dutch 
legislation  for  parental  leave  is  unpaid  while  civil  servants  are  entitled  to  a  75%  of  last 
earnings benefit during their leave. In this case, if women are more concentrated in public 
sectors  which  are  more  likely  to  use  supplementary  collective  agreements  for  leave,  the 
effects captured by the changes in official legislation in this study may not be identical to the 
effects of leave facilities in general. 
  Figure 2 shows the average durations over time of the three leave variables for EU-15 
and Norway. The first is the duration of maternity leave, second of the weighted (maternity 
and parental) leave and the last line of the longer parental leave.  
 
- Figure 2 Here - 
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While most leave legislation started with a short maternity leave right of about 3 months, 
introduction  of  parental  leave  policies  has  complicated  the  legislative  landscape.  Some 
clusters  with  regard  to  parental  leave  legislation  are  nevertheless  visible.  Countries  like 
Finland, Sweden and Denmark assume a dual earner family and support their leave legislation 
with generous allowances. The male breadwinner model was more active in Germany (at least 
until 2007), Austria, Portugal and Spain. These countries have long durations of leave with 
low allowances, where one partner can take care of the newborn and the other stays in the 
labour force. United Kingdom, Ireland and Greece have more market oriented legislations and 
the  state  mandated  leave  duration  is  short.  Netherlands  diverges  from  this  minimalistic 
approach through greater use and rights for part-time work that allows a combination of leave 
and care, fitting the needs of the prevalent one and a half earner family. 
  Gendered employment to population rates were drawn from OECD (2010) statistics 
database. Statistics are available for the entire period between 1970 and 2010 except for 
missing data in several countries between the years 1970 and 1982. A major problem in 
studying  the  impact  of  parental  leave  through  aggregate  participation  data  is  that  OECD 
counts parents on parental leave as employed. This may lead to some overestimations of the 
labour market effects. OECD database also provides the usual weekly hours worked data for 
women between the ages 25 and 54. Finally, absolute numbers of working age populations 
from the OECD database are used in weighting.  
  Gendered wage data are from ILO statistics (2010) and cover a period between 1970 
and 2008. This relatively complete dataset is available only for the manufacturing sector. Data 
were  drawn  from  both  ‘Key  Indicators  of  the  Labour  Market’  (KILM),  a  research  tool 
prepared by ILO, and the underlying database LABORSTA, which has data from years that 
are not yet in KILM. In general, the data from KILM are used and some additions were made 
from LABORSTA if no changes to measurement, definitions or surveys were visible between 
a given country’s KILM and LABORSTA data. Unfortunately, no gendered wage data could 
be  found  for  Spain  and  Italy.  There  are  also  a  large  number  of  missing  years  for  each 
country’s dataset. While the manufacturing wage data is the most complete for the period   11 
under  study,  it  comes  with  strong  limitations.  The  high  level  of  horizontal  occupational 
segregation indicators observed across Europe stems mostly from the concentration of women 
in public sector or service jobs (Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009). Thus manufacturing wages 
give a wage indicator for only a small portion of employed women. Furthermore, it is a sector 
that has downsized considerably in recent years, making it a rather unstable one. 
For  a  small  number  of  countries,  namely  United  Kingdom,  Portugal,  Finland, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Denmark, there are wage data from different sectors in the 
period  between  1994  and  2008.  Out  of  these  sectors,  “financial  intermediation”  has  the 
highest wages in all countries and data drawn from LABORSTA for this sector is used as a 
proxy for high skill wages. Once again there are some, though fewer, missing years of data. 
All wage data used in regression analyses have been deflated by the consumer price index and 
multiplied by the purchasing power parities found in the OECD database to make the values 
comparable  across  years  and  countries.  The  base  year  used  by  OECD  in  calculating  the 
consumer price index is 2005. 
  The final labour market outcome studied, vertical occupational segregation, is based 
on an indicator constructed from data provided by Eurostat (2010). Through labour force 
surveys,  the  number  professionals,  managers,  legislators  and  senior  officials  are  made 
available. The number of women between the ages 15 and 39 in these jobs as a share of total 
number of persons working in these jobs within the same age group is used as an indicator for 
vertical occupational segregation. Data exists for the period between 1992 and 2008. There 
are only a few missing cases in earlier years.  
  The evolution of the averages of three of the labour market outcomes studied in this 
study can be found in figure 3, which shows the gender gaps in wages and employment, and 
vertical segregation. Wage data used is nominal manufacturing wage data. The results for 
wages should be interpreted with care because missing cases in various years for different 
countries  can  cause  a  false  impression  of  large  changes  in  the  average  wage  gap.  The 
employment gap shown is between men and women aged 25 to 34. Interestingly, the decline 
in the employment gap is not fully reflected in a decline in the wage gap, which seems to have   12 
stabilized around 20%. Various demand side and institutional explanations, such as the role of 
workplace  characteristics,  have  been  offered  for  the  puzzling  persistence  in  the  pay  gap 
despite decreases in experience and education gaps (Rubery et al., 2005). Lastly, the trend for 
the  shares  of  employed  women  working  as  managers,  legislators,  senior  officials  and 
professionals as an indicator of vertical occupational segregation is mapped out. While there 
are no dramatic changes, there is a steadily rising trend.  
 
- Figure 3 Here -  
 
 
4. Methodology  
The model setup used is nearly identical to Ruhm’s (1998) original DDD model. This section 
simply provides a summary and describes any changes with regard to the data and model 
used.  The  starting  difference-in-difference  model  exploits  changes  in  leave  over  time. 
Subscript  j   denotes  country  and  t  time  while f   and  m   refer  to  female  and  male 
respectively. 
 
1 1 2 1 2 3 fjt f j t jt f j f jt f j fjt Y a S C T L S C S L S T β β δ γ γ γ ε = + + + + + + +  (1) 
1 1 2 1 3 mjt m j t m j m t mjt Y a S C T S C S T β β γ γ ε = + + + + + (2) 
 
Where,  fjt Y  is the log natural form of a labour market outcome for women,  j C is a country 
effect and  t T is a time effect. The effects of leave, jt L , are assumed to be exclusive to the 
treatment  group  of  women.  Finally,  f S is  the  gender  specific  intercept.  To  remove 
endogenous country and time effects, a DDD model is estimated by subtracting equation (2) 
from (1), which results in: 
   13 
1 1 3 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 0) ( ) jt f m f m j f m t f jt fjt mjt Y a S S S S C S S T S L γ γ γ ε ε ∆ = − + − + − + − + − (3) 
jt fjt mjt Y Y Y ∆ = −  
 
Simplifying and adding country-specific time trends to avoid biases resulting from gender 
specific time effects, the final estimation is reached. Ruhm (1998) notes that keeping the age 
groups constant across men and women would account for cohort effects. Additionally, in all 
the regressions in section 5, a quadratic term is added along with lags for both leave and leave 
squared. The quadratic term is added to allow for diminishing or increasing effects depending 
on the length of leave, rather than limiting the results to linear effects over all lengths of 
leave.  
 
2 2
1 2 1 2 3 1 4 1 3 jt j t jt jt jt jt j t jt Y a C T L L L L C T β β δ δ δ δ β ε − − ∆ = + + + + + + + +  (4) 
 
  For a correct interpretation of the outcomes, a few caveats of the methodology need 
to be taken into account. So far the notation used is for men as the control group and women 
as the treatment group. This may not be completely accurate as father’s use of available 
parental leave days has reached nearly 20% in Sweden, up from around 2% in 1978 (Nyberg, 
2004). If the take-up of leave has the same effects for men as for women the assumption of 
( 0) f jt S L δ −  will not hold and there may be an underestimation if the effect of leave is 
identical for men and women. Furthermore, households can make decisions jointly, and a 
decision to work or take leave can have an impact on the labour supply of the partner. Instead 
of an identical impact on men and women, men could lower their labour supply using parental 
leave if the participation effect is positive for women. The overall bias, if any, can then be 
positive or negative. To correct for this bias, older men in the age range between 45 and 54, 
who may be less likely to use parental leave, are used as the control group. There is no data 
on the fatherhood distribution of men, and this is simply a guess at the age group where it 
may  be  low.  Due  to  differing  availability  of  data  between  indicators,  the  age  difference   14 
between women and men was only incorporated into the analysis of participation rates. For 
women, total fertility rates are known for different age groups. Despite heterogeneity, the 
fertility rates seem to peak either in the 25 to 29 or 30 to 34 age range across European 
countries. While helping to target the investigation to those who are most likely to be affected 
by leave legislation, using the rather narrow age range of 25 to 34 leaves out women giving 
birth on a later age. Since education and motherhood age have been shown to be positively 
correlated (Hank, 2002), the sample may be skewed towards the less educated. If such women 
are more responsive to the supply side incentive leave legislation offers or benefit more from 
job security, this can cause an overestimation of short-term participation effects. 
  The  final  point  that  needs  to  be  mentioned  is  on  weighing.  Heteroskedasticity  is 
certain given the difference in population sizes. The results are reported using both ordinary 
least squares  (OLS)  with robust  standard  errors and  weighted  least  squares (WLS) as an 
additional check. The second uses the weighting procedure employed by Ruhm (1998) that 
was first worked out by Blackburn (1997).  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Participation and Leave 
Two different dimensions of economic participation will be taken into account. The first is 
labour market participation, captured by the employment to population ratios. The second 
dimension is intensity, referring to weekly hours worked. The results in table II show the 
effects of weighted leave on the employment to population ratio of women between the ages 
25 and 34 and 15 and 64. For the former, the control group used is men between the ages 45 
and 54 though results using a control group of men between the ages 25 and 34 are also 
presented. For the latter, the control group is men aged between 15 and 64; whatever effect 
parental leave may have on recent fathers, it should be fairly minimal on the full working age 
sample. Leave variables are lagged twice and lagged variables account for a large portion of 
the effects. This is most likely because changes in leave legislation might happen mid-year 
and it takes some time until the labour market fully absorbs their effects.    15 
 
           - Table II Here - 
 
Table II presents the sums of the coefficients for current and lagged leave and leave squared 
from six different models. The top row shows the age group of women and the control group 
used. For each combination of treatment and control groups, two models are fitted using 
robust and WLS specifications indicated in the second row. The final row shows the ρ-values 
for a joint F-test on all leave related variables including both lagged and current variables for 
leave and leave squared. The difference between the robust and WLS specifications is small. 
In all models, the ρ-values show significant positive effects from the leave variables with 
significant negative effects from the quadratic terms, at least at the 10% level. The positive 
effects,  combined  with  negative  coefficients  on  quadratic  terms,  means  that  participation 
increases with leave, but the effects diminish with the length of leave. Note that the standard 
errors presented in parentheses underneath the sums of coefficients are for current leave and 
leave squared. There is some evidence of a lagged effect as the significance of effects is 
mostly due to two year lagged leave variables. Models fitted using men between ages 25 and 
34 as the control group instead of men aged between 45 and 54 results in positive, but smaller 
effects. The significance does not change. The smaller effects may be due to underestimation 
if male labour market behavior in this age group is affected similarly to that of women by 
leave legislation. 
Based on the regression coefficients, it is possible to calculate the estimated effects of 
different lengths of weighted leave. This gives a rough idea about the optimal levels of leave. 
Figure 4 plots the effects. The coefficients from the robust standard error estimations are used.  
 
- Figure 4 Here -  
 
Figure  4  shows  that  the  main  participation  effect  of  leave  is  for  the  fertility 
concentrated  group.  The  impact  on  the  total  employment  to  population  ratio  declines   16 
proportionally if the entire female labour force is taken into account. The optimal amount of 
weighted leave, combining both maternity and parental leave, to maximize employment is 28 
weeks for the age group between 25 and 34. The effect at this point is more than 2.5%. The 
optimal length is slightly smaller, about 6 months, for the 15 to 64 age group and results in an 
increase in participation of 1.8%. It is unclear how large of an overestimation
2 there is due to 
counting employees on leave as employed while collecting data for employment to population 
ratios.  According  to  1992  data  from  Denmark,  1.25%  of  female  employment  was  on 
maternity leave, including other family reasons this number becomes 2.6% (OECD, 1995).  
Earlier macro level studies of Ruhm (1998) and Jaumotte (2003) had found about 20 weeks of 
leave to be optimal. The optimal duration found here may be longer due to the inclusion of 
unpaid leave rather than only paid leave.  
  Parental leave may also have an effect on hours worked, if without a period of leave 
women would prefer shorter working hours to balance their work and family lives. Intensity 
of work could be measured through several indicators including the rate of part-time work, 
annual  hours  worked  and  weekly  usual  hours  worked.  In  this  paper,  weekly  usual  hours 
worked is preferred. Part-time work does not differentiate between numbers of hours of work 
while annual hours worked may be influenced by differences in sectors’ vacation lengths. The 
treatment group is women between the ages 25 and 54. The control group is men between 25 
and 54. Table III presents the results.  
 
- Table III Here - 
 
Table III uses the same format as table II. The sums of the lagged and current leave 
variables show positive effects. The negative effects for the quadratic leave variable indicate 
diminishing returns. Under both specifications, the effects are significant at the 1% level. A 
right to 30 weeks of paid leave increases working hours of women by about 6%. Increasing 
leave duration from 13 weeks to 30 weeks results in a 3% increase in weekly hours worked. 
The positive results reinforce the notion that without paid parental leave as a time out of   17 
work, women may be pushed into combining work and care through shorter working hours. 
This can have long lasting effects, considering evidence of strong attachments to contract 
types whether it is a part-time or full-time contract (Blank, 1989). Parental leave thus provides 
a policy tool to promote more full-time labour market attachment.  
 
5.2. Wages, Occupations and Leave 
Previous studies hint that the positive effects of leave on participation may be overshadowed 
by its impact on wages and career opportunities. The aggregate effects are studied through 
three dependent variables; wages in manufacturing, wages in financial intermediation and 
share  of  women  working  as  professionals,  legislators,  senior  officials  or  managers.  The 
former is an indicator for low skill wages, the second for high skill wages and the final for 
occupational  segregation.  All  three  dependent  variables  are  once  again  in  the  log-natural 
form.  No  differentiation  between  age  groups  can  be  made  for  the  wage  data,  but  the 
occupational data is for the group aged between 15 and 39. The results of OLS and WLS 
estimations for all three dependent outcomes are presented in table IV.  
 
- Table IV Here - 
 
Table IV shows results for weighted leave related variables from six different models, 
once again using the two specifications for each of the measures that are used and indicated 
on the top row. In all cases the control group is made of corresponding males. The ρ-values 
on the bottom row indicate significance at least at the 10% level for effects on high skill 
wages  and  occupational  segregation,  with  the  exception  of  the  WLS  specification  for 
occupational segregation. No significant effects could be found for manufacturing wages. In 
general, the effects on wages and occupations are more concentrated on current leave rather 
than  lagged  leave.  Compared  to  supply  side  factors,  demand  controlled  factors  seem  to 
respond  faster  to  legislative  change.  Figure  5  shows  the  predicted  effects  of  different 
durations of leave using coefficients from the robust standard error estimates.   18 
 
-  Figure 5 Here – 
 
The difference between the effects on the two wage categories, manufacturing wages and 
financial intermediation wages, is striking. While the effects on manufacturing wages are 
insignificant, financial intermediation wages decrease exponentially as leave length increases, 
dropping around 7.3% at 30 weeks.  The insignificance of the effects on manufacturing wages 
seems surprising given that Ruhm (1998) had found a negative effect from generous parental 
leave on manufacturing wages. His interpretation is that the increase in supply, the decrease in 
human capital for longer rights to leave, and replacements costs would drive wages down. 
Despite downward pressure on wages due to an increase in supply, the insignificant effects on 
manufacturing wages can perhaps be explained by their proximity to the minimum or starting 
wages which would constrain how low wages can fall. In explaining the effects on financial 
intermediation wages, the increase in supply is simply not large enough; while the positive 
participation  effects  were  small  and  diminishing,  the  negative  effects  on  financial 
intermediation wages are large and exponential. 
The second explanation refers to the impact of human capital. If manufacturing jobs are 
essentially unskilled, any potential negative effects of long-term interruptions due to parental 
leave on human capital would be insignificant. Employees in skilled sectors are more prone to 
suffering  from  human  capital  effects  of  leave  take-up.  While  parental  leave  legislation 
protects firm-specific human capital to a certain degree by providing job protection, general 
human capital will depreciate during leave. The different impact of parental leave on general 
and firm specific human capital is important if firm-specific human capital and general human 
capital influence wages in different sectors and skill levels to varying degrees. Using German 
data, Dustmann and Meghir (2005) conclude that low skilled workers benefit highly from 
firm-specific tenure, but less so from experience while high skilled workers’ wages increase 
with both tenure and experience. This would suggest that firm attachment and job security 
provided by leave legislation is more relevant for manufacturing wages than for financial   19 
intermediation  wages.  Or,  stated  differently,  high  skilled  wages  would  be  more  likely  to 
decrease substantially due to depreciation of general human capital during parental leave. 
Cost of training and hiring of replacements for leave takers is the last explanation offered 
for a decrease in wages due to leave legislation. Considering the increased use of temporary 
contracts and availability of temporary agency workers across Europe, employers may be less 
likely to have large replacement costs which would be passed on to potential parental leave 
takers. Nevertheless, replacement costs can still be substantial in high skill sectors, especially 
if  availability  is  low.  According  to  Eurostat  data  from  2009,  while  more  than  15%  of 
employees with a highest education level of secondary schooling have temporary contracts in 
the EU, this proportion is less than 10% for employees with tertiary education. The difference 
in  availability  and  costs  of  hiring  temporary  workers  in  manufacturing  and  financial 
intermediation sectors might therefore also explain part of the differences seen in effects from 
parental leave on these two sectors. 
Figure  5  also  significant  negative  effects  on  the  proportion  of  women  in  high  skill 
occupations. The contraction in demand appears to be large enough to decrease employment 
in high level occupations even if supply was to increase. A supply contraction argument 
involving self-selection of women into careers with flat wage profiles could be made based on 
the  large  decrease  in  wages,  but  requires  strong  assumptions  of  perfect  information  and 
forward-looking rationality. According to our calculations, the effects on the share of women 
in high level occupations are small, about -1.5% at 30 weeks, but significant. Effect sizes are 
rather flat across different leave lengths after 12 weeks. Overall, the two significant findings 
of this section, vertical segregation and drop in high skill wages, signal a strong contraction in 
demand  for  female  employees  in  high  skill  occupations.  The  negative  effects  may  be 
signalling scarcer high skill labour in the economy as a whole as a result of leave legislation. 
When interpreting the negative effects, it should be noted that in the 40 years and 16 
countries that are analyzed in this paper, all countries had some sort of maternity or parental 
leave. Thus the significant effects, whether on participation, wages or occupations, are based 
not on the introduction, but of lengthening or increasing the benefits of leave. Clearly, having   20 
no legislation for leave at all may lead to an even worse impact on wages and occupational 
segregation, especially if the employers do not provide an alternative. 
 
6. Conclusions and Discussion 
Based on the history of maternity and parental leave in Europe, leave legislation in the future 
is  unlikely  to  see  any  declines,  but  will  go  through  further  optimization.  The  general 
impression that female employment to population ratios are improved through more generous 
leave certainly helps the case for it, especially if one considers the Lisbon targets that focus 
heavily on participation rates. The results in section 5 support the idea that job-protected leave 
can draw women to enter the labour market and increase labour supply (though the effects 
may  be  overestimated  due  to  data  collection  methods).  The  positive  participation  effect, 
however, comes at a cost, as women become less likely to work in high level occupations and 
receive lower wages when they do. As such, negative demand side effects dominate for high 
skill workers. Even the rough estimates calculated in this study show that the worsening of 
high skill wages can be substantial. Compared to Ruhm’s (1998) previous estimations, results 
here suggest a slightly lower increase in employment accompanied by a larger decrease in 
high skill wages while the negative effect on manufacturing wages becomes insignificant. 
One redeeming factor is the higher number of hours worked by women when leave legislation 
becomes more generous.  
  The analysis this paper has presented is undoubtedly rough, given the aggregate and 
cross-country nature of the data and the inevitability of large number of missing values. The 
cross-country perspective has meant that portions of leave schemes are effectively ignored 
because the focus is purely on national level legislation. Since take-up rates remain unknown 
in many countries and most of the years of all countries in this study, strong assumptions had 
to be made to allow for cross-country comparisons and to use men as the control group. Data 
used is only a proxy for high and low skill wages, indicators for which long running gendered 
datasets are generally difficult to find. Despite these limitations, the aggregate approach helps 
place parental leave within the more macroeconomic framework of employment, working   21 
hours and wages. The study thus provides a general indication of the effects it has had and 
may have over the years in Europe. 
  According to the results presented, leave policy can be approached in two ways. The 
first is to exploit the non-linearity of participation effects and aim paid leave of about 20 
weeks, including both maternity and parental leave. This would both minimize the negative 
effects on high skill wages and occupational segregation while providing the bulk of the 
participation benefits. The second would be to purely concentrate on participation. In this 
case, a paid leave period of about 30 weeks seems to give the best results, which is longer 
than previous estimates of 20. The longer leave period suggests that unpaid leave, which was 
not taken into account by Ruhm (1998), may have a stronger effect than expected. Since 
positive effects were also found for weekly hours worked, the 30 week option would be 
particularly preferable in countries where part-time work has a lasting and negative impact on 
future earnings and career opportunities.  
  Applying the results to the EU level, the case for extending minimum parental or 
maternity leave is not strong from a purely labour market perspective. The current legislation 
of 14 weeks of paid maternity leave and 12 weeks of supplementary parental leave seems to 
capture  most  of  the  positive  effects  for  participation  rates.  Anything  beyond  the  current 
minimum  is  likely  to  have  minimal  impact  on  participation  while  potentially  decreasing 
wages and causing occupational segregation. Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to design 
leave legislation based only on labour market effects given the large impact parental leave can 
have on fertility and child health. Instead, the results of this paper should be used in lieu with 
findings from research on fertility and health effects of leave to consider the full costs and 
benefits of parental leave.  
 
Notes:  
1. A simple way to show the supply increase would be to consider a wage-utility function 
containing both pecuniary wages and leave opportunities:    22 
( , ) W U U w L = = with the usual assumptions  0 , 0 w L U U > > , 0 w w L L U U < . 
For the sake of simplicity, if the returns are linear and homogenous under specific levels of 
leave and pecuniary wages: 
U w L = + , if
*
*
1
w
L
U
U
= . A government increasing leave from 0 to L* will have increased total 
gain from work even if wages were to drop. The potential for the increase is greater where 
wages  are  higher.  A  similar  model  is  used  by  Sinn  (2003,  pp.  95)  in  explaining  the 
improvement of working conditions. 
2. A very rough estimate can be made by considering total female employment and leave 
duration. Assuming 1.5 children on average, 6 months of leave take-up and an average of 30 
years  of  working  life  between  retirement  and  market  entrance  for  an  employment  to 
population ratio of 50%, leave take up will account for 1.25% of the EP ratio. 
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Appendix I: Parental and Maternity Leave Duration/Benefits in 2008  
  Maternity / Paid Leave  Parental Leave 
  Duration  Replacement 
Rate  Duration  Weight 
Weighted 
Leave 
Austria  16  100  104  33  50.32 
Belgium  15  77  12  33  15.51 
Denmark  18  100  32  100  50 
Finland
 a  43.5  90 and 66  112.5  33  67.97 
France  16  100  156  33  67.48 
Germany
 b  14  100  104  66 and 33  83.16 
Greece  17  100  13  33  21.29 
Ireland  26  80  14  33  25.42 
Italy  21.5  80  43  33  31.39 
Luxembourg  16  100  26  100  42 
Netherlands  16  100  13  33  20.29 
Norway  42  100  52  33  59.16 
Portugal  17  100  104  33  51.32 
Spain  16  100  156  33  67.48 
Sweden  60  80      48 
UK  26  35.7  13  33  13.57 
 
a  In  Germany,  the  recent  2007  reform  changed  the  right  to  parental  leave  to  one  year  and  the 
replacement rate to 67%. Parents can opt for spreading the benefit over two years. To take into account 
both options, first year is weighted by 66% and the second by 33%.
 
b In Finland, a recent reform in 2007 increased replacement rates to 90% in the first 56 days of leave. 
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Figure 1: Economic Consequences of Leave 
 
 
Figure 2: Development of Leave in EU-15 and Norway 
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Figure 3: Evolution of Labour Market Outcomes in EU-15 and Norway 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Wage Gap Employment Gap Share of Women in High Level Occupations
 
Wage  gap  calculated  as  the  difference  between  genders  as  a  proportion  of  male  wages: 
( )
*100
f m
m
Wage Wage
Wage
−  
Employment gap calculated as the difference between genders as a proportion of male employment to 
population ratio: 
( / / )
*100
/
f m m m
m m
E P E P
E P
−
 
Share of women in high level occupations calculated as:  *100
f
f m
High
High +
 
Figure 4: Participation and Leave 
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Figure 5: Wages, Occupations and Leave 
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Tables 
 
Table I: Weighting Leave Durations 
Benefit %  Weight 
0-33%  33% 
33-75%  66% 
75-100%  100% 
 
 
 
Table II: Employment/Participation Ratios of Women and Weighted Leave 
 
Age  25-34 (n=490)  15-64 (n=505)  25-34 (n=505) 
(Control Group)  (Men 45-54)  (Men 15-64)  (Men 25-34) 
Specification  Robust  WLS  Robust  WLS  Robust  WLS 
Leave  0.18 
(0.14) 
0.19 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.09) 
0.17 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
 Leave
2  -0.33 
(0.15) 
-0.33 
(0.17) 
-0.29 
(0.11) 
-0.31 
(0.13) 
-0.23 
(0.14) 
-0.22 
(0.14) 
ρ-value  0.07*  0.045**  0.06*  0.01***  0.016**  0.0*** 
 “Leave” is weighted leave divided by 100 for ease of interpretation. “Leave
2”
 is its square. 
Change  in  participation  due  to  a  given  length  of  leave  is  calculated  using  the  formula: 
2 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 3 4 1 3 2 exp( ) 1 t t t t t t Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave β β β β β β − − − − ∆ = + + + + + −  
Standard errors reported in parentheses are for  t Leave and 
2
t Leave  
ρ-values are from F-tests performed on all leave variables including lagged leave instead of only leave 
and leave
2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table III: Working Hours of Women and Weighted Leave  
25-54 (n=359)  Age 
(Control Group)  (Men 25-54) 
Specification  Robust  WLS 
Leave  0.25 
 (0.05) 
0.28 
(0.06) 
Leave
2  -0.21 
(0.06) 
-0.22 
(0.07) 
ρ-value  0.0***  0.0*** 
30 Weeks Leave  5.95%  6.5% 
“Leave”  is  weighted  leave  divided  by  100  for  ease  of  interpretation.  “Leave
2”
  is  its  square. 
Change  in  working  hours  for  a  given  length  of  leave  is  calculated  using  the  formula: 
2 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 3 4 1 3 2 exp( ) 1 t t t t t t Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave β β β β β β − − − − ∆ = + + + + + −  
Standard errors reported in parentheses are for  t Leave and 
2
t Leave  
ρ-values are from F-tests performed on all leave variables including lagged leave instead of only leave 
and leave
2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table IV: Wages and Occupations of Women and Weighted Leave  
Dependent  Manufacturing Wages 
(n=327) 
Financial Wages 
(n=133) 
Share of Women  (15-39) in 
High Level Occupations 
 (n=268) 
Control group  (Men)  (Men)  (Men) 
Specification  Robust  WLS  Robust  WLS  Robust  WLS 
Leave  0.15 
(0.08) 
0.15 
(0.1) 
-0.18 
(0.22) 
-0.16 
(0.37) 
-0.18 
(0.45) 
-0.17 
(0.49) 
Leave
2  -0.17 
(0.09) 
-0.17 
(0.11) 
-0.24 
(0.32) 
-0.27 
(0.5) 
0.42 
(0.39) 
0.39 
(0.51) 
ρ-value  0.14  0.5  0.0***  0.02**  0.07*  0.58 
“Leave” is weighted leave divided by 100 for ease of interpretation. Leave
2 is its square. 
Change  in  an  outcome  due  to  a  given  length  of  leave  is  calculated  using  the  formula: 
2 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 3 4 1 3 2 exp( ) 1 t t t t t t Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave β β β β β β − − − − ∆ = + + + + + −  
Standard errors reported in parentheses are for  t Leave and 
2
t Leave  
ρ-values are from F-tests performed on all leave variables including lagged leave instead of only leave 
and leave
2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 